This article suggests a new concept of measurement for the EU's oft-alleged democratic deficit based on two contributions. First, we turn attention to the administrative staff involved in policy-making rather than the (un)accountability of EUs' parliamentarians and executive agents. Second, building on the idea that policy-makers' legitimacy depends on the extent to which they can claim to represent some groups or social interests, we assess the extent to which Commission officials' preferences reflect European citizens' policy stance. Our results indicate a statistically significant positive correlation between the policy preferences of EU administrative staff and their home country population, which, we argue, can provide EU administrators a basic degree of legitimacy relative to their home country.
INTRODUCTION
156; Curtin et al. 2010; Montanaro 2012; Olsen 2013) . A narrow focus on electoral accountability thus is likely to be both restrictive and deficient.
Starting from the observation that policy advice, development, interpretation, implementation and enforcement in the EU involves public officials from all member states, this article explores a new mechanism to improve accountability. Under the standard view of democratic legitimacy and electoral accountability, public administrations lack legitimacy almost by definition as 'most issues and premises that guide administrative behaviour never reach the attention of elected politicians and citizens ' (Olsen 2013: 465; Peters 2010) . Indeed, EU bureaucrats have only featured in the debate on the EU's democratic deficit to the extent that they are considered to embody the remoteness of EU institutions or the power exercised by 'unelected bureaucrats'. This paper, by contrast, is inspired by Waldo's (1952: 81) contention that 'a theory of democracy in the twentieth century must embrace administration'. The substantial public administration involved in EU policy-making processes is important for our overall assessment of the EU's input legitimacy. The reason is that the considerable influence of the EU public administration over policy outcomes through the exploitation of bureaucratic discretion (Pollack 2003; Jabko 2006; Olsen 2006; Schafer 2014) creates a framework where popular policy preferences may influence EU policies even if the bureaucrats are not elected.
The underlying argument links to a more basic conception of legitimacy based on 'the extent to which [individuals] legitimately represent, or can successfully claim to represent, some group or larger set of social interests' (Saward 2005: 179; Saward 2010 Saward , 2014 . Since the existence of representative claims is central to establishing democratic institutions' legitimacy (Kröger and Friedrich 2013; Riccucci et al. 2014) , the contention advanced here is that administrative representation can 'operate as a legitimacy enhancer' (Gravier 2013: 833) . The legitimacy of the EU institutions should thus be measured also in terms of the Since the representativeness of public administrations increases 'when the identity of the bureaucrat matches that of the client' (Riccucci et al. 2014: 537) , 'administrative legitimacy' can be operationalized by measuring the extent to which the policy preferences of policy makers reflect those of the wider population. If EU policies should be supported by a majority of its citizens (as argued by Follesdal and Hix 2006) and representation is 'about giving accurate information on the constituents' preferences' (Piattoni 2013: 233) , this is an important measure. Hence, although the traditional representative bureaucracy literature emphasizes the importance of public bureaucracies reflecting the communities that they serve in ascriptive terms, the extent to which bureaucrats share the same policy preferences as the wider population may provide a stronger measure of representativeness.
Although such a concept of administrative legitimacy may appear to be at odds with the impartiality requirement implicit in ideal-type Weberian bureaucratic decision-making (Weber 1978; Olsen 2006) , three points are important. The first is that the Weberian idealtype has rarely been achieved in practice. Second, the desirability of Weberian dualism has been challenged even in theory. Third, recognition of expertise as a basis of the bureaucrat's claim to legitimacy need not be inconsistent with the representative requirement. Hence, the concept of administrative legitimacy suggests a new metric for assessing the democratic credentials of the EU: namely, the extent to which the policy preferences of EU civil servants reflect those of their compatriots at home.
New understandings of representation and liberal democracy
Government accountability is conventionally taken to be established via regular, free and fair elections in which incumbents are ousted when the populace deems their performance unsatisfactory (Curtin et al. 2010; Montanaro 2012; Kröger and Friedrich 2013) . In lamenting the role and power in EU policy-making of unelected executive agents and indirectly elected European parliamentarians, much of the existing literature on the EU's democratic deficit falls into this traditional framework.
Yet, recent theoretical scholarship on representation and legitimacy expresses a need 'to enlarge the conceptualisation of democratic representation beyond elections ' (Kröger and Friedrich 2013: 163; see also Rothstein 2009; Peters 2010) . This new literature is premised on the view that 'a range of actors (…), elected as well as unelected ones, may succeed in making effective representative claims' (Saward 2014: 731; Montanaro 2012) . This line of argument is particularly relevant when the traditional territorial state -in which the standard view of electoral accountability and legitimacy has greatest validity -is challenged (Curtin et al. 2010; Lord and Pollak 2010; Olsen 2013) . The European Union itself provides a salient example of such a setting, and thus is a candidate for exploration using an expanded conceptualisation of democratic legitimacy based on 'non-elective modes of representation' (Saward 2014: 733; Montanaro 2012) .
The shift to non-elective modes of representation requires reconfiguration of the 'conceptual tools [required] to assess if, and when, non-electoral forms of representation can be democratically legitimate' (Montanaro 2012 (Montanaro : 1106 . This paper focuses on public bureaucracy as one non-elective mode of representation. The choice derives from the fact that 'public bureaucracy is becoming an increasingly important locus for democratic activity' The degree to which public administrations (and administrators) 'can successfully claim to represent some group or larger set of social interests' (Saward 2005: 179; Saward 2010 Saward , 2014 ) -and thereby achieve administrative legitimacy -thus depends on the overlap of their policy preferences with the relevant constituent population. In the representative bureaucracy literature, this intersection -usually constrained to socio-demographic factors, but here extended to policy preferences (see also Murdoch et al. 2016 ) -is known as passive or descriptive representation. It is differentiated from active or substantive representation, which refers to action in the interest, or on behalf, of the represented (Pitkin 1967; Mosher 1968 ). The analysis presented in this paper rests solely on the passive overlap between the policy preferences of public officials and the broader population.
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HOW REPRESENTATIVE? AN EMPIRICAL MODEL
To operationalise the concept of administrative legitimacy, two complementary measures are proposed. The first rests on the idea that whenever one group (e.g., Belgian citizens) wants more/less of a certain policy relative to some other group (e.g., Irish citizens), public administrators representing these groups should -at the very least -replicate this preference ordering. This implies evaluating the cross-sectional correlation in the policy preferences expressed by EU administrators from a particular country and their country's population.
3 A positive correlation between the position of public officials and their principals along some policy scale represents a minimal requirement for administrative legitimacy.
A key issue at this point concerns the choice of the appropriate reference group in the EU setting: i.e. should Commission administrators' policy preferences reflect those of the population in their home country, or those of the EU population as a whole? The former approach would require assessing whether Commission officials can claim legitimacy relative to their home country constituencies, though not necessarily to the overall EU population (and vice versa for the latter approach). Although important theoretically, this choice has no direct methodological implications. The empirical analysis below takes member state populations as the key reference groups because EU legitimacy is 'normatively constrained by the basic compliance-legitimacy relationship between member governments and their constituencies' (Scharpf 2009: 173) . In other words, the key issue is the extent to which the EU assists member states to 'meet their own obligations to their own publics', because the legitimacy of the EU can 'be indirectly derived from that of its national democracies where any obligations it helps meet are those of national democracies themselves' (Lord 2015: 5-6 ). Yet, the methodological equivalence brought forward here implies that future studies can be developed taking the EU population as a whole as the reference group.
A positive correlation between two sets of policy preferences need not necessarily imply that public officials from certain countries are 'closer' in a spatial sense to their home population than public officials from other countries. Yet, a larger 'distance' between the preferences of public administrators and their principals may weaken public officials' claim to represent popular preferences. To capture more explicitly this spatial dimension of administrative legitimacy, our second operationalization calculates the Euclidian distance between the position of EU administrators and European citizens in a multi-dimensional policy space. The Euclidean distance between two points is essentially the length of a straight line connecting them. Imagine that these two 'points' are the policy preference vectors of an EU administrator (BUR) and the broader population (POP) along a number of dimensions (j=1,…,J) in the multi-dimensional policy space: (BUR 1 , BUR 2 ,…, BUR J ) and (POP 1 , POP 2 ,…, POP J ). The distance between both sets of policy preferences can then be calculated for each public official i as:
Hooghe (2003) similarly calculates the difference between the policy preferences of Commission officials and the EU population on a policy-by-policy basis to study relative support for EU policies between European elites and public opinion. Equation (1) generalises this approach to a multi-dimensional policy setting. Smaller numbers imply that the two sets of preferences lie closer together in the multidimensional policy space, such that EU officials can at least to some extent claim to represent the population's underlying policy preferences (in the sense of Saward 2005 Saward , 2010 ) -and thereby achieve administrative legitimacy.
This spatial approach is also close in spirit to the procedure proposed by Tsebelis et al. (2001) for assessing the degree of adoption of European Parliament amendments in co-decision procedures. Tsebelis et al. (2001) code the degree of amendment adoption on a fivepoint scale (i.e. adopted, largely adopted, partially adopted, modified, not adopted), depending on how extensively the draft legislations changed in line with amendments proposed. As such, they essentially measure the 'distance' between the preferences of the European Parliament and the final agreement in a multi-dimensional 'amendment space'.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data and operationalisation
To assess how including administrative legitimacy affects the EU's legitimacy shortfall, we draw on a unique new dataset that combines information from Eurobarometer surveys of public opinion with information collected via two web-based surveys among EU civil servants. Both surveys generated comprehensive information about respondents' policy preferences, but this paper concentrates on preferences regarding the appropriate level of decision-making within the EU as an issue of sovereignty (i.e. the authority to adjust the content of a given policy), rather than preferences towards specific public policy programmes. The opinion of European citizens towards the EU polity and its activities is measured using Eurobarometer data. As an individual's stance towards the EU may vary across policy areas, the approach here is to follow Hooghe (2003) in focusing on a Eurobarometer question that specifically refers to various policy areas: 'For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the national government, or made jointly within the European Union?'. Support for the first half of the statement (and thus in favour of national policy-making) is coded as value 1, while support for the latter half of the statement (and thus in favour of EU policy-making) is coded as value 2. The question is repeated for 18 policy areas (including 'fighting crime', 'taxation', 'defence and foreign affairs', 'immigration', 'health and social welfare', and 'the educational system'). This makes it possible to calculate the share of a country's population that favours/opposes EU-level decision-making for each policy area -as well as an average preference across all policy areas. Our coding of public attitudes thus reflects the population share of a given country holding a specific opinion. To prevent the recent economic recession from affecting this measurement, we use information from the last Eurobarometer before the onset of the on-going financial crisis (Eurobarometer 67.2 from 2007). 4 To measure Commission officials' preferences towards the EU polity, data was collected via a unique web-based survey administered between January and April 2011 to all 1098 then-active Seconded National Experts (SNEs) in the European Commission. The sample available for the present analysis consists of 379 respondents (approximately 35% of the total SNE population), and is representative in terms of age and gender. Its distribution across Directorate-Generals also reflects that observed for all Commission SNEs in 2011 (see also Murdoch and Trondal 2013; Trondal et al. 2015; Murdoch et al. 2016) . To measure SNEs' attitudes towards the EU project, the survey included a question asking: 'Before entering the Commission, did you generally think that co-operation within the EU was positive (negative) attitudes towards the EU increases, SNEs from that country tend to also express a more positive (negative) opinion about cooperation within the EU in general (column 1). This positive correlation is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
Results for Seconded National Experts
Furthermore, the remaining columns of table 1 indicate that the same positive correlation arises in four out of six policy areas. On the whole, therefore, this fairly consistent correlation between public officials' policy preferences and those of their home country populations implies that EU officials can at least to some extent claim to represent their home country population -and thereby achieve some degree of administrative legitimacy.
Interestingly, the overall positive correlation observed in column 1 appears largely driven by the statistically highly significant -and substantively strong -positive correlation observed for the 'external relations' (and, to a lesser extent, the 'social regulation') portfolio.
While the exact mechanism driving these results can, unfortunately, not be established based on our current data, this observation at least suggests that there rests a more stringent legitimacy requirement or constraint (in the sense of Scharpf 2009) on public officials dealing with 'contentious issues such as foreign affairs and social policies' (Schafer 2014: 912) .
These policy areas have also witnessed less integration. A higher degree of administrative legitimacy could thus be employed to counter potential fears that decisions at the European level in these policy areas are 'not subject to the same controls as decisions at the national level' (Andreatta 2011: 34) .
One might also wonder whether the results in respondents from the EU9 countries. One possible reason is that these countries' decisions to enter the EU followed a period of observation from the periphery of how the European Community functioned, and was based on a strategic calculus rather than a primordial response to the experience of war (as for the original Six; e.g. Gerber [1994] ) or a reaction to new-found independence and a desire to re-join 'Europe' (as for many of the EU10+2; e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier [2005] ). In other words, the politics of EU membership differed significantly for the EU9, and followed repeated and protracted debates concerning the 'sovereignty bargain' inherent to the European integration process (Litfin 1997; Mattli 2000) . 6 This can be expected to impose a more stringent legitimacy requirement on public officials from such countries. Importantly, the EUCIQ data allow us to take the analysis a step further, and look at the correlations of policy preferences at the level of specific policies. Extending our analysis in this way generates only a limited number of statistically significant correlations (see rows 2 to 10 in table 2). Clearly, some significant connections will arise purely due to chance when calculating a substantial number of correlation coefficients (i.e. 63 in our case). Yet, it is noteworthy that all but two of the significant correlations in table 2 are positive, whereas finding positive or negative significant correlations should be equally likely if they arose purely due to chance. Moreover, the significant positive correlations once again arise nearexclusively in the more contentious policy issues under analysis: i.e. foreign policy, social policy and immigration. These results thus are in close accordance with those obtained above, which strengthens our confidence in the idea that contentious policy areas appear to induce a more stringent legitimacy requirement on public administrators in the Commission.
Results for permanent Commission administrative staff
Having access to preferences expressed at the level of specific policies also enables calculation of the Euclidian distance between the policy-preference vectors of EU public administrators and the population in their member states. As mentioned, this complements the correlational approach by focusing on the spatial dimension of administrative legitimacy. The empirical approach here proceeds in two steps. The first is calculation of the Euclidian distance between Commission officials' policy preferences and those of their home country population for all 1618 individuals in our sample. The second is to average the obtained distances for all respondents in each of the six Directorate-General clusters, and for all public policies. The results are reported in table 3.
The most important information contained in table 3 refers to the relative size of the observed distances in the multidimensional policy space across DG clusters and public policies. This highlights which sections of the Commission are 'closer' to the policy preferences expressed by EU officials' home country populations, which is informative even though the calculated absolute distances arguably lack a strong substantive meaning. We therefore also report the statistical significance of the difference between the mean of the distance measure in a given DG cluster (columns 2 to 7) and the mean of the distance measure calculated across all EU administrators (column 1). The asterisks in table 3 represent this additional information. ___________________ Table 3 about here
___________________
The results in table 3 indicate that there are only eight statistically significant differences between the average distance measure in a given DG cluster (columns 2 to 7) and the average distance measure calculated across all officials (column 1): four each at the 90% and 95%
confidence levels. This is a low number given that 60 tests were performed and that the tests are not fully independent (since a lower average distance in one DG cluster compared to the average distance across all Commission officials must be 'compensated' by a larger average distance in at least some other DG clusters). The findings therefore suggest that there do not appear to be particular subsets of Commission officials -defined either in terms of their policy area or DG cluster -that are located particularly 'close' in policy space to their home country population. In other words, even though Commission officials' policy preferences on the whole are positively correlated with those of their home country populations (see table 1 and 2), this does not imply that certain subsets of EU public officials are located closer in a spatial sense to their home country populations. While such country-specific policy closeness can help administrators to act as a 'national legitimating mechanism' for the normative and political powers exercised by the EU (Lindseth 2010: 14) , its absence might also be viewed as good news for the Commission. Indeed, while some degree of administrative legitimacy is obtained from the positive correlation in the policy preferences of EU administrators and their home countries, the lack of strong patterns in the calculated Euclidian distances suggests the absence of country-specific policy biases that might be challenging the autonomy of the institution as a whole.
CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to make three contributions to the literature on the EU's 'democratic deficit'. The first is the argument that administrative legitimacy, which has so far been absent from the EU debate, needs to be applied in consideration of the EU's democratic credentials.
Such administrative legitimacy should be factored in as an important criterion of the EUs' input legitimacy besides electoral accountability. Second, although the EU's ratings may not match national political systems on the standard measure of electoral accountability or the existence of a demos, our analysis of original data illustrates that the European Commission scores much better on the representative bureaucracy dimension. This finding stands in direct contradiction to the popular view that the EU is undemocratic specifically on account of the Commission's status and influence.
Our third contribution speaks to the literature on representative bureaucracy rather than on the EU's democratic deficit. The measure used in this paper to demonstrate the representativeness of the Commission -i.e. the sharing of policy preferences -is new and novel. Historically, the representative bureaucracy literature has contended that an administration should reflect the ethnic, linguistic, national and/or gender composition of the wider community that it serves. The measure introduced in this paper goes a step further. It suggests that it is not sufficient for a public bureaucracy to look like the wider community, but that within its workforce there must be staff members who think like them.
It is important, however, to observe that our analysis of administrative legitimacy is based on an objective standard of representation rather than citizen's subjective perception thereof.
This is important since it may be less straightforward at the EU level -compared to, say, the 2 Although attitudinal similarity (i.e. passive representation) may be a necessary condition for active representation, it is certainly not a sufficient condition for acting upon those shared attitudes (Selden 1997; Sowa and Selden 2003) . Hence, passive and active representation need not necessarily be causally connected. Even so, recent work often does find they are closely connected (Murdoch et al. 2016) . This raises the potential concern that Commission officials following the active representation model might not be doing their jobs as supranational officials. Indeed, any potential lack of autonomy from member states is a key concern for international bureaucrats, since "what is at stake here is the very concept of an impartial ICS [i.e. International Civil Service]" (Mouritzen 1990: 35-36) . For recent contributions on this autonomy issue among Commission officials, we refer to Ellinas and Suleiman (2012) and Trondal et al. (2015) , while Weiss (2013) provides a discussion with respect to the same issue within the United Nations.
for administrative legitimacy would require that (a segment of) Commission officials likewise shows this temporal ordering of policy preferences. 4 As an alternative measure of European citizens' overall preference towards European-level policy-making, we also exploit the question: "Generally speaking, do you think (your country's) membership is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad?". This allows calculating the share of a country's population answering that EU membership is a 'bad thing'. All results below are qualitatively similar using this alternative question (details upon request).
5 As the dataset for SNEs does not include public officials' opinion towards EU-level decision-making across a range of policy areas, we cannot calculate the Euclidian distance measure. Hence, we here only perform the correlational analysis. 
